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The pace of transition in China over the last two decades has led to great variation across the coun-
try in terms of institutional and financial development.  In this paper, using a panel of Chinese 
provinces during the period 1993–2006, we empirically investigate the determinants of the effi-
ciency of the banking sector from an institutional perspective.  The most important institutional 
developments in China are the emergence and gradual dominance of the market economy, financial 
deepening, the growth of a private sector, the establishment of secure property rights, and rule of 
law.  We find that institutional variables play an important role in affecting banking efficiencies, 
and that banks tend to operate more efficiently in those regions with a greater private sector pres-
ence and more property rights awareness, while the role of financial deepening and rule of law is 
less straightforward.   
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Kiinan järjestelmämuutos viimeisen kahden vuosikymmenen aikana on johtanut suuriin alueellisiin 
eroihin institutionaalisessa ja rahoitussektorin kehityksessä. Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tutkitaan 
Kiinan provinsseja koskevaa vuosien 1993–2006 ns. paneelidataa käyttäen pankkisektorin tehok-
kuuteen vaikuttavia tekijöitä instituutioiden näkökulmasta. Tärkeimpiä institutionaalisia kehity-
saskelia Kiinassa ovat olleet markkinatalouden periaatteiden painoarvon selvä kasvu, rahoitussek-
torin ja yksityisen sektorin kasvu, omistusoikeuden periaatteiden hyväksyminen sekä laillisuuspe-
riaatteen aiempaa yleisempi noudattaminen. Tulosten mukaan institutionaaliset tekijät vaikuttavat 
selvästi pankkien tehokkuuteen. Pankit ovat tehokkaampia provinsseissa, joissa yksityisen sektorin 
osuus taloudesta on suuri ja joissa omaisuudensuoja on varmempi. Rahoitussektorin koon ja lailli-
suusperiaatteen vaikutus tehokkuuteen ei ole yksiselitteinen. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In most economies around the world, banks, as dominant suppliers of external finance, 
play an important role in channeling capital from savings to investment (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, 2001).  The role of banks in economic growth has been well established in the 
existing literature, starting with studies of King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, 1993c).  How-
ever, the conventional measure of the role of banking institutions in the economy has been 
focused on the quantitative side, such as the ratio between the liquid liabilities of the bank-
ing system and GDP (Gertler and Rose, 1994; King and Levine, 1993b, 1993c), the ratio of 
domestic credit to GDP (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), and the share of credit granted to the 
private sector in ratio to GDP (King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Levine, 1998, 1999; Beck 
et al., 2000; Wurgler, 2000).  The quantitative measures of banking presence have short-
comings in the sense that they essentially concentrate on the role of banks in stimulating 
capital accumulation.   
As the literature has shown, the specific role performed by banks in the economic 
system is not to intermediate savings, but rather to certify the quality of borrowers and in-
crease their probability of successful innovation to enhance productivity, and to monetize 
liabilities which otherwise would fail to find purchasers in the markets (Fama, 1985; Min-
sky, 1986; Moore, 1988; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988; Lucchetti, Papi, and Zazzaro, 2001).  
Therefore, banking efficiency, which measures the relative ability of banks to efficiently 
utilize their resources to generate outputs, is a better measure because it captures the qual-
ity of banking institutions and their function in the economy. 
Studies of banking efficiency are abundant, and they yield important implications 
for financial institutions in areas of government policy, research, and managerial perform-
ance (see survey by Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  However, the existing literature that 
attempts to explain the determinants of banking efficiency primarily focuses on a number 
of banks, markets, and regulatory characteristics.  While recent literature emphasizes the 
role of institutions in explaining economic transitions and growth (Henisz, 2000), institu-
tional factors as potential sources of determinants of banking efficiency have largely been 
ignored (see the survey by Berger and Mester, 1997).   
An institutional setting, constituting both formal and informal rules and their en-
forcement, is what defines the incentives and wealth-maximizing opportunities of both in-
dividuals and organizations.  Aron (2000) argues that institutions affect growth because Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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they influence the costs of transactions and the efficiency of production.  Consequently, the 
institutional environment may well affect the way in which banks conduct business, and 
their rate of efficiency.  Law and finance literature, pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998; LLSV hereafter), document that some environ-
ments are more conducive to designing and enforcing financial contracts than others, and 
that better contracting leads to better outcomes.  For example, Berger and Udell (2006) 
suggest that elements of the legal/institutional infrastructure may have important effects on 
the abilities of banks to use “hard” information lending technologies to extend credits to 
SMEs.  A recent study by Qian and Strahan (2007), document that strong creditor rights 
seem to enhance loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide credit on favorable 
terms.     
Furthermore, some studies substantiate the importance of other aspects of the in-
stitutional setting for bank practices.  For example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue 
that the optimal concentration of creditors reflects the trade-off of inefficient renegotiation 
following default against borrowers’ incentive to default strategically.  Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven, and Levine (2003) document that rigid regulations on bank entry and bank activi-
ties will lead to an increase of the cost of financial intermediations.   
In a standard cross-country setting, banks’ ability to force repayment and their 
costs of enforcing contracts can be measured by legal and institutional variables.  How-
ever, it is very difficult to observe and control for the set of social, cultural, and relation-
ship variables that potentially play an important role in affecting financial intermediation 
across a large number of countries.  In this paper, we examine the role of institutions in ex-
plaining banking efficiencies, using provincial data in China, which is one of the largest 
and fastest growing transitional and emerging economies in the world.  In using the sub-
national level data, we are able to focus on specific aspects of the institutional and political 
system while largely avoiding the data comparability issue common in most cross-nation 
studies.   
The late twentieth century witnessed the transformation of numerous centrally 
planned economies around the world into market systems.  Instead of making the transition 
through a “Big Bang” (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004), China has followed an incremental and 
experimental approach to reform that has resulted in high and stable growth rates for over 
three decades (Prasad and Rajan, 2006).  Amid the miracles of the Chinese economy’s high 
growth rates, the role of the banking sector, despite its predominant size, is inconclusive in BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




the existing literature (see, Hasan, Wachtel, Zhou, 2008).  The Chinese banking sector has 
been dominated by four very large state-owned banks – the “Big Four” – with about three-
fourths of banking assets.  Given the size of the banking sector in China, the level of inef-
ficiency of Chinese banks found by the existing literature (e.g., Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 
2008), and the implications of banking efficiency for financial stability, firm growth, and 
the macro economy as we discussed earlier, it would be interesting to examine the poten-
tial determinants of the banking efficiencies in China.  Our paper answers this question by 
looking at the institutional environment in which the banks operate.   
In this paper, we measure the efficiency of the banking sector for a region as a 
function (i.e., weighted average) of the efficiency of the banks that operate in that region.  
We then exploit the regional differences in the timing and extent of the development of le-
gal and political institutions to demonstrate the impact on banking efficiency.  Our results 
show that different institutional factors tend to have different effects on the efficiency of 
the banking sector.  To be specific, a higher degree of financial deepening in the banking 
sector is found to be positively related to profit efficiency, but negatively related to cost 
efficiency.  Our results indicate that the presence of the private sector is positively and sig-
nificantly correlated to both the profit and cost efficiency of the banking sector in a certain 
region.  We also find that our proxy for awareness of property rights is positively and sig-
nificantly correlated to both the profit and cost efficiency of the banks.  Moreover, we 
document that the rule of law is negatively associated with banking profit efficiency, but 
positively associated with banking cost efficiency.  In sum, our empirical results indicate 
that banks tend to operate more efficiently in those regions with a greater private sector 
presence, and more property rights awareness, while the role of financial deepening and 
rule of law is less straightforward.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides some back-
ground information on the institutional environment, reforms in China, and related re-
search.  Section 3 describes our data and the various measures we employ for institutional 
development.  In Section 4, we present our empirical results relating bank efficiency meas-
ures to the institutional environment.  Section 5 summarizes and concludes the discus-
sion/analysis.   
 Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
 
 
Do better institutions improve bank efficiency?  





2  Institutions and banking in China and related literature 
 
2.1   Institutions in China 
 
While China has maintained a fast pace in economic growth as a whole, it exhibits substan-
tial regional differences as well.  For example, Aziz and Duenwald (2001) show that the 
variation in China’s economic performance has displayed some distinct geographical pat-
terns.  In addition, the provincial data reveals significant variation in relative economic 
performance over time (Demurger et al., 2002).  Meanwhile, the transition from planned to 
market economy in China necessitates the establishment of an almost entirely new set of 
institutions, and the development of institutions is not evenly distributed across different 
regions.  As we have argued, differences in regional institutional development may affect 
the efficiency of the local banking system.  In order to place our study in the institutional 
context in China, we provide a description of relevant institutional reforms in China over 
the last two decades. 
  Credit markets in China play a major role in channeling capital from saving 
to investment.  However, the capital allocation to the private sector only comprises a small 
portion of GDP, compared to other developed countries.  It was not until the early 1990s 
that the central government started to reform the financial system by separating policy 
banks from commercial banks.  In the subsequent years, a series of steps were taken to 
transform urban credit unions into commercial banks (1996-1998), grant limited licenses to 
non-state commercial banks and foreign banks, and introduce standard accounting and 
prudential norms.  Many additional changes were introduced after China’s entry into the 
WTO in 2001, including the liberalization of interest rates, and the relaxation of restric-
tions on ownership.  Recently, the Chinese government took cautious actions to partially 
privatize its banks by selling shares to both domestic and foreign investors, who, in the lat-
ter case, can hold minority equity stakes (see, Berger et al., 2008).  
The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in 1991 was initially aimed at promoting the reform of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs).  Hence, financially stressed SOEs can obtain direct equity financing through 
both initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings in the markets.  Though listing 
the SOEs as publicly traded companies, the government still holds controlling stakes.  In BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




order to pursue better corporate governance, the equity division reform was promoted in 
the past two years.   
Corporate bond markets lagged behind the development of the equity market.  Al-
though bonds were first issued in 1986, outstanding corporate bond issues in 1999 were 
only about one-half of one percent of GDP (People's Daily, Sept. 1, 2000).  The corporate 
bond market began to expand after 2000 when new rules governing issuance were imple-
mented.  Besides the giant SOEs, local firms were also encouraged to issue corporate 
bonds.   
  The emergence of a prosperous private sector, which now accounts for ap-
proximately a third of GDP (IFC, 2000), has been a major outcome of the market-oriented 
reform in China.  Small private firms were first formed in rural areas, and not officially 
recognized until 1988.  In the 1990s, privatization was introduced to revitalize SOEs.  In 
1999, a constitutional amendment formalized the recognition of the private sector.  Despite 
the contributions of the private sector to the economy, private firms, especially those with-
out state-owned equity stakes, have limited access to bank credits and stock markets, and 
thus have to rely heavily on informal financial channels and self-financing.  
  The development of the modern Chinese legal system started after the Cul-
tural Revolution, and became a government priority in the 1990s.  Numerous laws, regula-
tions and administrative rules have been enacted since 1979, including new legislation re-
garding the regulation of securities markets, consumer protection, intellectual property, and 
banking and insurance.  Accordingly, institutions to enforce the rules have also been estab-
lished.   
As part of its economic and legal reforms, the government adopted a law to pro-
tect foreign patents in 1984.  In the late 1980s, regulations went into effect that enabled 
enterprises to define property rights and separate collective and private enterprise shares.  
The 1994 Company Law improved property rights by establishing the firm as a legal en-
tity.  It is noteworthy that laws regarding property rights were locally enacted, following 
national legislation, and thus the strength of legal enforcement differed across regions 
(Krug and Hendrischke, 2003). 
This brief summary of major changes in the economic environment and institu-
tions in China points out two important issues.  First, the reform process has already 
touched on a broad range of economic, political, and social institutions.  Second, reforms 
are often locally based, and thus there is variation across the country and over time in insti-Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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tutional development.  In this paper, we explore these regional differences over time, and 
investigate whether and to what extent these institutional differences affect bank effi-
ciency. 
 
2.2   Banking industry in China 
 
In this section, we briefly discuss the institutional history, regulation, and economic envi-
ronment of the Chinese banking system.  This system has continuously undergone signifi-
cant changes due to policy shifts over the last twenty years.  
The Chinese socialist banking system was established in the late 1940s, following 
the system in the former Soviet Union.  The central bank, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), founded in 1948, was stripped of many of its central bank functions during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), but later regained responsibility for currency issue[for 
issuing currency] and monetary control.  Before 1978, the Chinese system followed a 
mono-bank model in the sense that the PBOC assumed the roles of both central and com-
mercial banking.  Other banks were either taken over or restructured into the PBOC sys-
tem.  The banking system expanded by establishing several large state-owned commercial 
banks which took the lending functions from the PBOC.  The Bank of China (BOC, estab-
lished 1912), China Construction Bank (CCB, 1954), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC, 
1979), and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC, 1984) were initially limited 
to serve only their designated sector of the economy (i.e., foreign trade and exchange; con-
struction; agriculture; industrial and commercial lending).  In 1985, the Big Four were al-
lowed to compete in all sectors.  Nonetheless, competition among them was very limited 
until the mid-1990s because they served mainly as policy-lending “conduits” for the gov-
ernment, and lacked incentives to compete. 
Because the majority of bank loans made by the Big Four went to SOEs, the asset 
quality of state-owned banks deteriorated significantly during the 1990s.  The government 
established three policy banks in 1994 to take over the policy-lending activities, and issued 
special, 30-year government bonds totaling 270 billion RMB (US $32.6 billion) in order to 
recapitalize the Big Four banks in 1998.   
Although there is no explicit deposit insurance, implicit deposit insurance is in 
place in the sense that the Chinese government has almost always intervened in case of 
bank failure.  However, things began to change in 1999 when Guangdong International BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Trust and Investment Corporation were unable to repay outstanding debt in amounts ex-
ceeding US $5 billion.  The central government did not assume the main repayment re-
sponsibilities as creditors expected, and debt-holders finally collected an average of 
12.54% back from their original investment.
1 
In 1995, two major legislative reforms occurred.  The Central Bank Law of China 
went into effect to establish the PBOC as the central bank and substantially reduced the 
influence of local governments on credit allocation decisions.  In addition, the Commercial 
Bank Law of China of 1995, officially termed the major objective of state-owned banks, 
was allowed to operate as a commercial bank according to market principles instead of pol-
icy lending.  At the same time, de novo banks were allowed to enter the market in the mid-
1990s. 
China became a member of the WTO in 2001.  Since then, a new set of regula-
tions as well as revisions of existing rules were established in line with the WTO agree-
ment.  In order to achieve better monitoring of the banking industry, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was set up in 2003 to oversee reforms and regulations.  
In 2003, the CBRC updated its guidelines to encourage foreign investors to purchase 
shares in domestic banks.  As a result, foreigners can own up to 25% of any domestic bank, 
with the ownership by any one investor allowed between 5% and 20%, subject to regula-
tory approval.  Strategic foreign investments have been induced first in some regional 
banks (e.g., Citigroup’s purchase of about 5% of Shanghai Pudong Development Bank in 
January 2003).  Since 2003, national banks, including three of the Big Four banks, have 
had strategic foreign investors holding minority equity stakes.  Another trend in the priva-
tization of Chinese banks is the encouragement by regulators to go public on domestic 
and/or foreign stock exchanges. 
 
2.3   Related research 
 
It is well recognized that financial sector development is very important to economic 
growth (King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c).  As financial intermediations, banks play 
a crucial role in allocating scare resource (i.e. financial capital) in the economy.  A well-
 
1 There are signs that the Chinese regulators are moving toward formal deposit insurance.  A “deposit insur-
ance office” was established within the Financial Stability Bureau of the PBOC in 2005.  It is also reported 
that the China Banking Regulatory Commission is working on plans to introduce a system like the U.S. Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation. Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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functioned banking system can largely promote economic growth by identifying the most 
promising entrepreneurs and increasing their probability of successful innovation to en-
hance the productivity.  Moreover, the existing literature has shown that the specific role 
performed by banks in the economic system is to certify the quality of borrowers and in-
crease their probability of successful innovation-enhancing productivity, and to monetize 
liabilities which otherwise would fail to find purchasers in the markets (Fama, 1985; Min-
sky, 1986; Moore, 1988; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988; King and Levine, 1993a; Lucchetti, 
Papi, and Zazzaro, 2001).  Banks are essential for economic development in that they are a 
crucial device for the selection of entrepreneurs and the allocation of financial and real re-
sources (Diamond, 1984).  In this sense, banking efficiency, which measures the relative 
ability of banks to efficiently utilize their resources to generate outputs, is a better measure 
in capturing the quality of banking institutions and their functions in the economy.  Indeed, 
over recent years, the concept of frontier efficiency has been well applied and documented 
in the banking literature.  Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a comprehensive survey of 
130 studies that apply frontier efficiency analysis to financial institutions in 21 countries, 
and as discussed, the efficiency studies yield important implications for financial institu-
tions in areas of government policy, research, and managerial performance.  However, the 
existing literature which attempts to explain the determinants of banking efficiency primar-
ily focuses on a number of banks, markets, and regulatory characteristics (see the survey 
by Berger and Mester, 1997), while leaving institutional factors as potential determinants 
of banking efficiency largely ignored. 
Meanwhile, prior studies have emphasized the important role of institutions in 
promoting the economy.  An appropriate institutional setting eases the transaction, re-
shapes the incentives of different agents, and affects the efficiency of production.  LLSV 
(1997, 1998), among others, document that stronger investor protection and more efficient 
institutions are correlated with better financial and economic outcomes.  However, time-
series evidence on financial development challenges some of the correlations documented 
by LLSV (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) docu-
ment that the institutional environment can also affect commercial banks’ interest margins 
and profits.  Based on a sample of loans in 43 countries, Qian and Strahan (2007) empiri-
cally investigate how financial contracts respond to the legal and institutional environment, 
and consistent with the law and finance view of LLSV, find that strong creditor rights seem BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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to enhance loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide credit on favorable 
terms.   
Moreover, well-defined property rights are cornerstones of private sector devel-
opment and growth.  The protection of property rights facilitates the development of finan-
cial markets.  Well-functioning and flexible financial markets allow entrepreneurs to em-
brace economic opportunities and promote growth by protecting entrepreneurs from being 
expropriated by large market participants.  Aron (2000) argues that institutions are often 
weak in developing countries because the rules that ensure the use and trading of property 
rights are absent or poorly enforced.  An empirical study of transition countries by Johnson 
et al. (2002) examines the relative importance of property rights and external finance, and 
finds property rights to be overwhelmingly important.   
A few studies have examined the role of institutional factors in firm-level activi-
ties in China.  For example, Cull and Xu (2005) use firm-level data and show that expro-
priation risk, contract enforcement, access to finance, and ownership structure all appear to 
matter for Chinese firms' reinvestment decisions.  Using data on Chinese entrepreneurs, 
Djankov et al. (2006) highlighted the importance of legal and economic institutions in fos-
tering entrepreneurship.   
Some other studies employ province-level data to examine financial sector devel-
opment and economic performance in China.  For example, Biggeri (2003) uses provincial 
level data for the period 1986 to 2001 and finds that the level of aggregate output in each 
province is negatively influenced by the presence of state-owned enterprises.  Liang (2005) 
and Hao (2006) present evidence that financial depth and the reduced role of government 
influence provincial growth rates.  Zhang, Wan, and Jin (2007) provide evidence of finan-
cial depth effects on productivity growth with provincial panel data.  More recently, Hasan 
et al. (2008) examine the effect of financial deepening and institutions on economic 
growth, and find that legal and political institutions play an important role in spurring eco-
nomic growth in China. 
Another line of research specifically examines Chinese bank efficiency and re-
form, and generates mixed results.  For example, Chen et al. (2005) compare the cost effi-
ciency of the Big Four banks and two smaller size classes of majority state-owned joint-
equity banks over the period 1993-2000, and find that the Big Four and smaller joint-
equity banks are both cost- efficient relative to the medium-sized joint-equity banks.   
However, some studies using an input distance function approach obtain contrary results Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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(e.g., Kumbhakar and Wang, 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2006).  Berger et al. (2008) investi-
gate the impact of ownership on bank efficiency and find that both a foreign majority and 
foreign minority ownership play a big role in improving the efficiency of Chinese banks.   
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are very few studies investigating 
how different institutional factors affect bank efficiency from an institutional perspective.  
As we discussed earlier, the economic performance of China’s economy exhibits great 
geographic variation, and so does the development of the financial and institutional envi-
ronment.  China provides an ideal laboratory for exploring how the different paces of insti-
tutional development may impact the banking sector’s efficiency.  Building on the existing 
literature, our study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by investigating whether and 
how the variation in regional institutional settings, including both financial and legal insti-
tutions, may affect the efficiency of the banking sector in China. 
 
 
3  Data collection and sample description 
 
In this section, we report our data collection procedure and provide a description of our 
sample formation.  We obtain our data from different sources to form a panel covering 
thirty-one provinces (including four municipalities which enjoy an administrative authority 
equivalent to those found in other provinces in China) for the time span from 1993 to 
2006.
2 
Our main intention is to investigate the effects of different institutional factors on 
bank efficiencies at the regional level.  Therefore, our dependent variables are banking 
profit efficiency and cost efficiency.  Profit efficiency and cost efficiency are first esti-
mated at the firm-year level, based on the stochastic efficiency frontier approach.  More 
generally, cost and profit efficiency measure how well a bank is predicted to perform rela-
tive to a “best-practice” bank producing the same outputs under the same environmental 
conditions.  That is, efficiency measures how close to the minimum cost or maximum 
profit a bank is, where the minimum and maximum are determined by best performers in 
the sample.  We estimate efficiency levels by specifying the commonly used trans-log 
functional form for the cost and profit functions.  For convenience, we show only the cost 
function: BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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where i, t index the bank and year, respectively, k = 1,…4 index the four output 
variables, and δ j k ≡ δ k j.  C represents the bank’s total costs.  While there is no consensus 
of the scope of the banking firm and no agreement on the explicit definition and measure-
ment of banks' inputs and output, we use a modified version of the value-added approach 
following Berger and Humphrey (1992).  In the value added approach, all items on both 
sides of the balance sheet may be identified as outputs or inputs depending on their contri-
bution to the generation of bank value added.  Accordingly, we specified four outputs (y): 
y1 (total loans), y2 (total deposits), y3 (liquid assets), y4 (other earning assets); three input 
prices (w): w1 (price of funds, proxied by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits), w2 
(price of fixed capital, proxied by the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets), w3 
(price of labor, proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total number of employees); 
and one fixed netput (z): total assets.  The cost function is estimated using the  it it ν μ ln ln +  
as a composite error term, where the  it μ ln  term represents a bank’s efficiency, and  it ν ln  is a 
random error that incorporates both measurement error and luck.  In other words, a bank’s 
cost efficiency score is determined by comparing its actual costs to the best-practice mini-
mum costs of producing the same output under the same conditions using estimates of the 
efficiency factor 
it μ ln , which is based on, in our case, the assumptions of half-normal dis-
tributions, and is disentangled from the estimated cost function residuals using maximum 
likelihood estimations.  The normalization by a bank’s total assets (z) reduces heteroske-
dasticity, and allows banks of any size to have comparable residual terms from which the 
efficiencies are calculated.  The normalization by the last input price (w3) ensures price 
homogeneity.  The summary statistics of the output and input variables used in the bank 
efficiency estimations are presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 The four municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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The firm-year level of profit (cost) efficiency scores are then aggregated at the 
province-year level, with the weights equaling  the proportion of each bank-year’s loans to 
the total loans of all banks present in that province-year.  More explicitly, we have 
Banking profit (cost) efficiency j, t =                                           …(2) 
n
μ















                                                                                    …(3) 
In equations (2) and (3), j indexes the j
th province in our sample, and equals to 1, 
2, …, 31.  i indexes the i
th bank in our sample, and equals 1, 2, …, maximum number of 
banks in j
th province.  t indexes year, and equals to 1993, 1994, …, 2006.  gi, j, t indexes the 
weight of i
th bank in j
th province in year t.  Li, j, t indexes the total loans provided by i
th bank 
to j
th province in year t. μ is the efficiency score estimated based on equation (1) for i
th 
bank in year t. 
These province-year aggregated profit (cost) efficiency scores are then used as the 
dependent variable(s) in the OLS regressions and fixed-effects regressions that we present 
later on.  For the independent variables, we have real GDP growth, ln (real GDP level), 
lagged, bank loans/GDP, equity and bond issuance/GDP, private sector, property rights, 
and rule of law.  Below we provide more detailed descriptions of these variables. 
We first include real GDP growth and lagged GDP level as the basic control vari-
ables in the regression analysis, given the natural link between broader economic devel-
opment and banking performance discussed earlier.  Real GDP growth is defined as the 
inflation-adjusted growth rate of annual GDP, and we use the lagged term of the natural 
log of real GDP (i.e., inflation-adjusted to the base year 1993) and label it as “ln (real GDP 
level), lagged”.  
We also include variables which control for the degree of regional financial de-
velopment and financial depth; one is based on the size of the banking sector, the other on 
the size of the market-based finance sector.  The size of the banking sector is measured by 
the ratio of regional banking loans to regional GDP (termed as “bank loans/GDP”), and 
regional banking loan data have been obtained from the annual issues of the Almanac of 
China’s Finance and Banking (ACFB).  The size of the market-based finance sector is 
measured by the ratio of equity and non-financial corporate debt (long-term and short-
term) issuance to GDP (termed as “equity and bond issuance/GDP”).  The issuance is for BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




firms incorporated in the respective province.  Our equity issuance data are collected by 
summarizing the equity issuance data from both exchanges in China, based on the annual 
issues of the Statistics Yearbooks of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the Statistical 
Yearbooks of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Equity issuance is defined here as the gross 
proceeds raised by listed firms from issues.  Data on corporate bond issuance have been 
collected from the ACFB and are available until 1999, and subsequently from the annual 
issues of the provincial yearbooks. 
Our main variables in the regression analyses are the variables capturing the insti-
tutional environment.  The first institutional aspect that we examine is the size of the pri-
vate sector.  We are interested in the link between the private sector and banking efficiency 
because our sample period from 1993 to 2006 represents an important privatization phase 
for China, and the influence of privatization on economic growth and the banking sector in 
transitional economies is not always obvious.  We follow Cull and Xu (2005), and interpret 
the relative size of the private sector in the Chinese regional economy as a proxy for the 
extent of property rights protection.  Thus, we expect this variable to be positively corre-
lated with growth.  The size of the private sector is measured by the ratio of regional pri-
vate sector total fixed investment to regional total fixed investment.  The data from China’s 
private sector are from the China Economic Information Network Database and the China 
National Statistics Bureau.   
Our second institutional variable is the awareness of and respect for property 
rights, particularly intellectual property.  Our proxy for the awareness of property rights is 
the ratio of the number of domestic trademark applications to the number of firms.  This 
ratio captures both awareness of property rights and the degree of development of secure 
property rights-associated institutions in each province.  Our hypothesis is that more 
trademark applications reflect confidence in the preservation of property rights, and a de-
sire to defend them.  Data on domestic trademark applications have been collected from 
the annual issues of the Almanac of China’s Property Rights, the Yearbook of China’s In-
dustrial and Commercial Administrative Statistics (which provides data starting in 1998), 
annual provincial yearbooks, a government-sponsored trademark website, and the online 
China Trademark database.  Missing data are backcastusing the national data and the pro-
portions of applications in the province to total applications in the country in 1998. 
Our third institutional variable is the rule of law.  Rule of law is very difficult to 
measure.  We use the presence of legal professionals as an indicator of both the quality of Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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legal proceedings and the rule of law. Specifically, our measure for the rule of law is the 
number of lawyers per 10,000 people.  Our justification for using this variable is that an 
increased presence of legal professionals in a province is an indicator of both the develop-
ment of legal institutions and of the mechanisms for law enforcement.  If more lawyers are 
at work, then there are greater efforts to promote public accountability and limit corrup-
tion.  The data have been collected from the Statistics Yearbook of China’s Legislation and 
the annual issues of the Statistics Yearbooks of each province, which provide data for 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002.  Additional information was collected from other web-
based resources, such as the China Law on Lawyering (china-lawyering.com), the China 
Lawyers’ Investigation web site (www.007cn.cn), and the China Lawyers’ website 
(www.chineselawyer.com.cn).  These websites provided additional data on the number of 
lawyers per province or city since the 1990s.  Missing data have been interpolated based on 
nationwide growth in the number of lawyers.  The population data have been obtained 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
The summary statistics of the regional aggregated banking profit and cost effi-
ciencies, and the independent variables used in the regression analyses, are presented in 
Table 2.  This paper presents different profit and cost scores than other papers such as Ber-
ger, Hasan, Zhou (2008), and it is because this paper defines production function with 
three inputs instead of two inputs, and the third input we use is price of labor.  However, 
despite the shifting of the mean and median of the profit and cost efficiency score that are 
estimated in this paper compared with other papers, we find that the results remain robust 
if the production function is defined alternatively with two input prices (price of funds, and 
price of fixed capital).  Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of the independent variables. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4  Empirical results 
 
In this section, we report our empirical evidence relating regional bank efficiency to insti-
tutional factors.  We model regional bank efficiency as a function of different institutional 
factors, controlling for province-level economic conditions.  More specifically, we intend 
to examine how the institutional environment may affect the profit efficiency and cost effi-
ciency of the banking sector in that region.   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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4.1  Institutions and banking profit efficiency 
 
In Table 4, we present empirical results relating banking profit efficiency to measures of 
institutional factors based on OLS regressions.  Column 1 contains our baseline model with 
only controls for regional economic conditions.  We find that provincial economic growth 
rates and the economic scale are positively correlated with bank profit efficiency.  In col-
umns 2-7, we enter different proxies for the institutional environment to test how regional 
institution development and the environment affect banking profit efficiency.  The absolute 
values of t-statistics are reported in brackets in all the regression tables, and *, **, 
***indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We now turn to the interpretation of different proxies for institutions and their ef-
fects on regional banking efficiency.  As we discussed earlier, we use two measures to cap-
ture the financial institutions.  The first measure, namely the ratio of bank loans to GDP, 
gauges the depth of the banking sector, which is significantly and positively associated 
with banking profit efficiency.  Our second measure is based on non-banking sources of 
private sector financing, including equity financing and bond issuances.  In contrast, the 
ratio of private sector financing to GDP possesses a negative relation with banking profit 
efficiency.  The activities of the banking sector and capital markets in China appear to have 
opposite effects on the regional bank efficiency.  However, these findings are not surpris-
ing.  The positive sign associated with the depth of the banking sector points out that bank 
lending activities generally correlate with increased bank efficiency.  In contrast, a region 
with more  capital market activities (i.e., equity issuances and bond issuances) tends to 
have lower banking profit efficiency.  Normally, there are very high thresholds for firms, 
be they state-owned or private, to participate in the equity markets or corporate bond mar-
kets.  Without strong corporate governance mechanisms, firms tend to choose to finance 
their projects with less monitoring.  This is the situation when firms choose arm’s-length 
financing resources (i.e., corporate bonds).  In the case of equity finance, minority share-
holders are not able to effectively exert their power on corporate decision-making, and tend 
to be speculative.  The consequence is that firms of good quality shy away from bank lend-
ing, leaving banks with relatively low-quality firms as their main customers.  Therefore, 
the depth of the capital market is negatively associated with bank profit efficiency.  Thakor 
(1998) develops a theoretical model to analyze the problems faced by emerging economies Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
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in developing their financial systems.  An important finding is that the relationship be-
tween banks and capital market is both competitive and complementary in a setting of tran-
sitional and state-dominated economies.  Banks complement market in the sense that in-
creasing banking efficiency, up to a point, actually leads borrowers accessing the market.  
Beyond that point, more borrowers will be competed away from the market by further im-
provement in bank efficiency.  Nonetheless, he argues, it may not be possible to develop a 
good capital market in an economy that does not have good banks, and that the initial focus 
in developing a financial system should be on improving the efficiency of banks.  In gen-
eral, our results are consistent with the Thakor (1998) model. 
With regard to other institutional factors, we find that a prosperous private sector 
is associated with better banking profit efficiency.  This is generally consistent with the 
existing growth literature.  Private firms contribute much to the economic growth, and 
have more incentives to keep up good relations with banks by not defaulting.  In contrast, 
as indicated by the existing literature (Berglof and Roland, 1998), state-owned firms tend 
to have different incentives to maintain bank-firm relationship in a centrally planned econ-
omy because of soft budget constraints.  Once the bank lending is directed and granted by 
the government, an SOE’s repayment of the loan is not strictly enforced.  In addition, it is 
well documented that small private firms are more flexible in choosing profitable projects 
and are able to capture entrepreneurial opportunities.  For example, Frydman et al. (1999) 
compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of Cen-
tral Europe, and argue that privatization has different effects depending on the types of 
owners to whom it gives control.  On the other hand, La Porta and Lopez De-Silanes 
(1999) examine privatized firms in Mexico and find that that privatization is followed by 
large improvements in performance.  Our observation is consistent with the existing litera-
ture and reflects the increasing importance of private sector to the economic growth and 
banking efficiency in the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy in China. 
  As a next step, we use two variables, property rights awareness and rule of 
law, to capture the legal environment in which banks operate.  Property rights awareness is 
measured by trademark applications, which are significantly and positively correlated with 
bank profit efficiency.  There is much literature that confirms that well-defined property 
rights induce agents to exert their efforts.  Consequently, creditors are better off in an envi-
ronment where property rights are strictly enforced.  The other measure is based on the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




number of legal professionals.  We attempt to capture a broad view of how legal institu-
tions are enforced.  However, this variable is negatively correlated with the profit efficien-
cy of the banking sector.  At first glance, we may wonder why strictly enforced legal insti-
tutions have a negative effect on regional banking profit efficiency.  Taking into considera-
tion the fact that most lending agreements between banks and SOEs are not strictly en-
forced in China, we predict that a strict legal environment should have a strong effect on 
the private sector.  Most private firms are small and rely on relationship lending to access 
external financing, and have less access to capital markets.  The literature in small business 
lending points out that “soft” information is the key feature in extending credit to small 
firms.  Soft information is generated in daily relationships, and an important feature of soft 
information is that soft information is very difficult to pass on.  Therefore, relationship 
banks need to invest a great amount of resources to collect proprietary information and 
tightly monitor their customers.  It is plausible that the strict enforcement of legal institu-
tions weakens such incentives and results in sub-optimal lending decisions with a higher 
default rate.  Therefore, we observe a negative relation between the rule of law and bank-
ing profit efficiency. 
In this section, we present our main empirical results on the impact of institutions 
on banking profit efficiency in the regional markets based on OLS regressions.  Our prox-
ies of institutional factors are measured at the province level and are unlikely to be affected 
by banking practices according to our construction of efficiency scores.  However, if there 
are unobserved characteristics which are correlated with our variable of interest but omit-
ted from the model, it would be inappropriate to draw any inference from the OLS results 
due to the biased estimation.  Therefore, for each regression, we include province fixed ef-
fects to control for the micro-level unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity.  In Table 5, 
we report our findings, relating banking profit efficiency to institutions based on fixed ef-
fects regressions. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  In general, controlling for unobservable time-invariant regional effects, we 
find consistent results as detailed above though the magnitudes of certain variables change 
slightly.  The depth of banking activities measured by the ratio of bank loans to GDP is 
positively correlated with banking profit efficiency, while the ratio of equity and bond is-
suances to GDP is negatively associated with banking profit efficiency.  The proportion of 
the private sector to the regional economy has a positive effect on banking profit efficien-Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
 
 
Do better institutions improve bank efficiency?  





cy, which indicates the importance of the private sector for banks to generate profits.  The 
awareness of property rights, an important feature of the institutional environment, is posi-
tively associated with regional banking profit efficiency, while rule of law reflects a nega-
tive effect on the profit efficiency of banking sectors.   
 
4.2   Institutions and banking cost efficiency 
 
Next, we  investigate how institutions affect banking cost efficiency in different provinces.  
As detailed before, we obtain the banking cost efficiency on a relative base.  We then re-
gress the banking cost efficiency score on a set of variables capturing the regional institu-
tional settings.  Table 6 reports regression results relating banking cost efficiency to our 
measures of institutions through OLS.  In column 1, we only enter basic controls for pro-
vincial economic conditions.  We find the economic size of an individual province is nega-
tively but insignificantly correlated with the banking sector’s cost efficiency.  Furthermore, 
the regional growth rate appears to have a negative and significant impact on banking cost 
efficiency.  It is plausible that a fast-growing economy may attract more banking activities, 
which consequently increase the competition.  With increased competition, borrowers’ 
specific information becomes more dispersed because each bank only knows a small por-
tion of the borrowers.  Banks then incur higher costs in gathering information.   
  In Table 6, columns 2-7, we use different model specifications by adding dif-
ferent sets of variables to capture the regional institutional environment.  The variable 
measuring the deepening of banking sectors is significantly and negatively correlated with 
banking cost efficiency.  To put it another way, our finding indicates that a province with 
higher banking activity tends to have lower cost efficiency.  It is documented that in China, 
banks do not compete by offering better services to attract low cost fund.  Consequently, 
intensive competition increases the cost of non-interest expense.  Therefore, we observe a 
negative relation between the ratio of bank loans to GDP and banking cost efficiency.  Our 
other measure for the financial institutions, the activity of equity and bond capital markets, 
seems to have an insignificant effect on banking cost efficiency. 
  Turning to our measures of legal institutions, we find that more awareness of 
property rights positively affects the cost efficiency of of a banking sector.  This finding 
indicates that in a province with better defined and awarded property rights, banks are bet-
ter off in terms of better cost efficiency.  Our other measure of the legal enforcement of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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institutions, rule of law, is also positively associated with banking cost efficiency.  Com-
bined with the findings outlined in the previous section, it appears that rule of law tends to 
have different effects on profit efficiency and cost efficiency in the banking sector.  As we 
have argued, banks operating in an environment with strict rule of law may have less in-
centive to spend resources in collecting proprietary information, which results in lower 
profit efficiency (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).  However, by reducing the investment in 
information collection, banks gain better cost efficiency. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
  For the same reason as we discussed in the prior section, it is possible that 
our main explanatory variables may correlate with unobservable characteristics possessed 
by different provinces.  We are able to control for this possibility by adding province fixed 
effects if those characteristics are time invariant.  Table 7 presents our findings based on 
regression via fixed effects.  As revealed in Table 7, our findings are pretty consistent, 
even after controlling for province fixed effects.  Those results are qualitatively the same 
as reported in Table 6.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
  In addition to the above tests, we perform several robustness checks.  We col-
lect more data on province-level economic activities (e.g., the number of firms and em-
ployment) and other demographic information.  Adding these variables does not change 
our main findings.  Therefore, for the sake of brevity, we report our empirical models as 
parsimoniously as possible.   
 
 
5  Summary and conclusion 
 
The efficiency of financial intermediation is essential for financial stability and sustainable 
economic growth.  Prior studies on banking efficiency primarily focused on firm-level 
characteristics, while leaving the impact of institutions on banking efficiency largely unex-
plored.  Meanwhile, important work such as LLSV (1997, 1998) has identified institutional 
factors, such as rule of law and property rights, as an integral part of a successful economy 
and financial system.  In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap in the literature by empiri-
cally investigating the determinants of banking efficiency from an institutional perspective.  
The uneven distribution of institutional settings and non-synchronized economic develop-Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang and Mingming Zhou 
 
 
Do better institutions improve bank efficiency?  





ment across different Chinese regions provides an ideal laboratory for answering this ques-
tion. 
  Based on a sample of 31 provinces in China during the period 1993-2006, we 
attempt to identify what institutional factors impact banking efficiency in China.  We first 
measure banks' efficiency at a micro level using the conventional stochastic frontier ap-
proach, and then aggregate the results at the regional level.  We then exploit the regional 
differences in the timing and extent of the development of financial, legal and political in-
stitutions to demonstrate the impact on the banking efficiency.   
Our results show that different institutional factors tend to have different effects 
on the efficiency of the banking sector.  Specifically, a higher degree of financial deepen-
ing proxied by bank loans to total GDP tends to relate to increased profit efficiency and 
decreased cost efficiency, while more financing in the private sector, proxied by equity and 
bond financing in the stock market, tends to relate to deceases in both profit and cost effi-
ciency.  The differences in the roles of banks and stock market financing in affecting bank-
ing efficiency, as we discussed earlier, may result from adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems in the financing decisions made by firms and the competition between banks and 
the capital market.  Another important aspect of institutional development in China, 
proxied by the presence of the private sector, tends to relate positively and significantly to 
both the profit and cost efficiency of the country’s regional banking.  This is not surprising, 
because the growth in the private sector tends to decrease the dominance of the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the regional economy, which results in a higher percentage of 
loans extended to the private enterprises instead of SOEs, and therefore increases the per-
formance of the banks in the region.  The variable property rights, proxied by the number 
of trademark applications per firm, and representing the degree of awareness of property 
rights in the industry sector, is found to be positive and significantly correlated with both 
the profit and cost efficiency of the banks.  On the other hand, rule of law, proxied by the 
number of lawyers per 10,000 people, is found to be negatively related to profit banking 
efficiency but positively and significantly related to cost banking efficiency.  As we dis-
cussed earlier, strict rule of law may lead to fewer incentives for banks to spend resources 
in collecting proprietary information, which results in less profit efficiency (Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006).  However, by reducing the investment in information collection, banks 
gain better cost efficiency.  In sum, our empirical results indicate that banks tend to operate 
more efficiently in those regions with higher presence of the private sector and more prop-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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erty rights awareness, while the impact of financial deepening and rule of law on banking 
efficiency is less straightforward. 
  Though China has achieved remarkable economic growth throughout the last 
two decades, the large disparities among institutional foundations across its regions could 
impose a big challenge for the further success of the economy and the increased efficiency 
of the banking sector throughout the country.  Therefore, our findings on the important role 
of institutions in banking efficiency could potentially yield implications for policy-makers 
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        Table 1  Summary statistics of variables used in stochastic efficiency frontier estimations 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of basic variables used in the profit and cost efficiency estimations.  In the translog-
based estimations of profit (cost) efficiency, the output variables considered are: y1 (total loans), y2 (total deposits), y3 (liquid 
assets), and y4 (other earning assets).  The input variables are: w1 (price of funds, proxied by the ratio of interest expenses to 
total deposits), w2 (price of fixed capital, proxied by the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets), w3 (price of labor, 
proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total number of employees).  The outputs are normalized by total assets.  All 
financial values are inflation-adjusted to the base year 1993. 
 
   Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Profit (Cost) (in billion US$)             
   Total Profits  524  0.180  0.014  0.719  -0.080  5.784 
   Total Costs  524  0.956  0.082  2.539  0.000  21.200 
Output Quantities (in billion US$)             
   Total Loans (y1) 524  23.614  1.517  62.360  0.000  426.000 
   Total Deposits (y2) 524  37.323  2.451  106.520  0.000  791.000 
   Liquid Assets (y3) 524  5.123  0.325  15.142  0.012  112.000 
   Other Earning Assets (y4) 524  16.489  1.308  48.285  0.005  444.000 
Input  Prices          
   Unit interest cost of deposits (w1) 524  0.023 0.023  0.017  0.003  0.067 
   Unit price of physical inputs (w2) 524  0.925  0.715 0.567 0.174  2.500 
   Unit price of labor (w3) 524  14.135  14.244  2.524  0.720  21.105 
Total Assets (in billon US$)  524  42.520 3.234 124.250 0.033  880.000 
 
Table 2  Summary statistics of variables used in the regression analyses 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables that are used in the regression analyses.  Profit efficiency and cost 
efficiency are first estimated at the firm-year level, based on the stochastic efficiency frontier approach, using the translog-
based profit and cost function with inputs and outputs specified in Table 1.  The firm-year level of profit (cost) efficiency 
scores are then aggregated at the province-year level, with the weights equaling to the proportion of each bank-year’s total 
loans to the total loans present in that province-year.  These province-year aggregated profit (cost) efficiency scores are then 
used as the dependent variable(s) in the OLS regressions and fixed-effects regressions that we present later on.  For the 
independent variables, we have: real GDP growth (defined as the inflation-adjusted growth rate of annual GDP), ln(real GDP 
level), lagged (defined as the natural log of real initial (or lagged) GDP), bank loans/GDP (defined as the ratio of total bank 
loans to GDP), equity and bond issuance/GDP (defined as the ratio of equity and non-financial corporate debt (long-term and 
short-term) issuance to GDP, private sector (defined as the ratio of private sector total fixed investment to overall total fixed 
investment), property rights (defined as the ratio of the number of domestic trademark applications to the number of firms), 
and rule of law (defined as the number of lawyers per 10,000 people).  All the independent variables are measured at the 
province-year level. 
 
   Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Stochastic Efficiency Frontier          
Profit  efficiency  432  0.833 0.817 0.041 0.782  0.921 
Cost  efficiency  432  0.471 0.490 0.057 0.314  0.574 
Explanatory Variables         
Real GDP growth  430  0.111  0.112  0.039  -0.020  0.224 
ln(real GDP level), lagged  430  25.187  25.161  1.356  21.292  28.379 
Bank  loans/GDP  431  0.920 0.860 0.371 0.377  2.925 
Equity and bond issuance/GDP  431  0.010 0.006 0.016 0.000  0.211 
Private  sector  430  0.449 0.471 0.146 0.025  0.703 
Property  rights  431  0.896 0.663 0.869 0.055  5.013 
Rule of law  430  0.952  0.745  1.005  0.147  7.446 
 Table 3  Correlation Matrix 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the independent variables in the regression analyses.  The definitions of the 
variables are the same as in Table 2. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1  Real GDP growth  1.000                   
2  ln(real GDP level), lagged  0.411  1.000       
3  Bank loans/GDP  0.007  -0.152  1.000      
4  Equity and bond issuance/GDP  0.026 -0.117  0.293 1.000      
5  Private sector  0.349 0.740 -0.120  -0.050  1.000    
6  Property rights  0.283 0.478 0.463 0.075 0.486 1.000  





  Table 4  Regression relating provincial banking profit efficiency to institutions: OLS 
Table 4 presents the ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions of banking profit efficiencies on the institutional variables and 
control variables.  The definitions of the variables are the same as in Table 2.  Absolute values of t statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, *** represent a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: banking profit efficiency 









[15.80] [14.12] [14.64] [16.14] [14.75] [11.05] [13.44] 








[3.83] [3.50] [3.79] [3.42] [3.63] [3.76] [3.49] 








[7.02] [7.98] [7.71] [3.62] [3.32] [8.80] [4.17] 
Bank loans/GDP   0.024
*** 0.030
***   0.001  0.053
*** 0.027
*** 
 [5.06]  [6.06]  [0.02]  [7.01]  [3.55] 
Equity and bond 
issuance/GDP 





   [3.98]  [3.76]  [3.27]  [2.89] 
Private sector      0.040
** 0.040
**   0.022 
    [2.43]  [2.32]    [1.30] 




    [10.96]  [7.99]    [8.68] 




    [4.79]    [3.99]  [5.24] 
Observations  428 428 428 428 428 428 428 
F-statistic  52.68 45.68 39.42 51.40 40.75 35.82 41.05 
R-square  0.20 0.24 0.27 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.41 
Adjusted R-square  0.19 0.24 0.26 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.40 Table 5  Regressions relating provincial banking profit efficiency to institutions: fixed effects 
 
Table 5 presents the province fixed-effects regressions of banking profit efficiencies on the institutional variables and control 
variables.  The definitions of the variables are the same as in Table 2.  Absolute values of t statistics are presented in brackets. 
*, **, *** represent significance a level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: banking profit efficiency 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 




[0.92] [1.25] [1.50] [7.49] [7.76] [1.58] [7.72] 







[1.84] [1.82] [1.92] [1.65] [1.99] [1.27] [1.86] 








[16.65] [14.97] [14.30]  [5.50]  [5.22]  [14.16]  [5.14] 
Bank loans/GDP   0.014
* 0.015
*   0.028
*** 0.008  0.012 
 [1.78]  [1.71]  [2.94]  [0.48]  [0.82] 
Equity and bond 
issuance/GDP 





   [1.78]  [1.77]  [2.05]  [2.50] 




     [2.73]  [2.34]  [2.46] 




     [7.29]  [7.37]  [7.48] 
Rule of law      -0.012
***   -0.004  -0.008 
     [3.01]  [0.54]  [1.27] 
Observations  428 428 428 428 428 428 428 
Number of group  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
F-statistic  186.26  125.48 94.56 109.68 91.94  75.56  79.16 
R-square  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.59 0.49 0.59 
Adjusted R-square   0.44 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.55 Table 6  Regressions relating provincial banking cost efficiency to institutions: OLS 
Table 6 presents the ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions of banking cost efficiencies on the institutional variables and 
control variables.  The definitions of the variables are the same as in Table 2.  Absolute values of t statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, *** represent a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: Banking cost efficiency 









[14.09]  [14.23]  [14.09] [9.18]  [8.40] [13.56] [9.02] 
Real GDP growth  -0.086 -0.072 -0.077 -0.051 -0.057 -0.073 -0.046 
[1.15] [0.96] [1.03] [0.69] [0.76] [0.98] [0.62] 
ln(real GDP level), lagged  -0.010
*** -0.011
*** -0.011
*** -0.005  -0.005 -0.013
*** -0.006
** 
[4.61] [4.96] [4.83] [1.57] [1.54] [5.43] [2.02] 
Bank loans/GDP   -0.017
** -0.019
**   0.001  -0.041
*** -0.026
** 
 [2.30]  [2.56]  [0.14]  [3.53]  [2.05] 
Equity and bond issuance/GDP     0.210  0.187  0.136  0.092 
   [1.25]  [1.12]  [0.79]  [0.55] 
Private sector      0.006  0.005    0.023 
    [0.21]  [0.16]    [0.80] 




    [5.07]  [3.49]    [3.81] 




    [2.71]    [2.44]  [3.20] 
Observations  428 428 428 428 428 428 428 
F-statistic  16.47 12.86 10.05 12.36  9.18  9.32  9.51 
R-square  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.14 
Adjusted R-square   0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.12 Table 7  Regressions relating provincial banking cost efficiency to institutions: fixed effects 
Table 7 presents the province fixed-effects regressions of banking cost efficiencies on the institutional variables and 
control variables.  The definitions of the variables are the same as in Table 2.  Absolute values of t statistics are 
presented in brackets. *, **, *** represent a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: banking cost efficiency 









[12.29] [11.62] [11.23]  [4.71]  [4.54]  [11.07]  [4.60] 
Real GDP growth  -0.060 -0.058 -0.059 -0.031 -0.042 -0.054 -0.028 
[0.73] [0.71] [0.72] [0.39] [0.52] [0.66] [0.35] 
ln(real GDP level), lagged  -0.021
*** -0.018
*** -0.018
*** -0.001  -0.001 -0.018
*** -0.001 
[6.13] [5.06] [4.89] [0.04] [0.09] [4.92] [0.01] 
Bank loans/GDP   -0.029
* -0.030
*   0.017  -0.044  -0.022 
  [1.82] [1.82]    [0.92] [1.49] [0.76] 
Equity and bond 
issuance/GDP 
   0.027  0.021  0.049  0.082 
   [0.14]  [0.11]  [0.25]  [0.43] 
Private sector      0.077
* 0.071    0.079
* 
     [1.66]  [1.52]  [1.69] 




     [4.46]  [4.03]  [4.21] 
Rule of law      0.013
*  0.007  0.021
* 
         [1.77]     [0.59]  [1.70] 
Observations  428 428 428 428 428 428 428 
Number of group  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
F-statistic  26.53 18.90 14.14 18.37 14.81 11.37 13.17 
R-square  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.19 
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